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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the costs associated with a suite of labor regulations in
India whose components have gone largely unstudied in developing countries. We take
advantage of the fact that these regulations only apply to ﬁrms above a size threshold.
Using distortions in the ﬁrm size distribution at the threshold together with a structural
model of ﬁrm size choice, we estimate that the regulations increase ﬁrms’ unit labor
costs by 35%. We document a robust positive association between regulatory costs and
exposure to corruption, which may explain why regulations appear to be so costly in
developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Restrictive labor regulations have been blamed for some of the most signiﬁcant problems
faced by developing countries, including low labor force participation rates and low levels of
employment in the formal sector.1 It has even been suggested that regulations may distort the
allocation of labor across ﬁrms, thus contributing to the substantially lower levels of aggregate
productivity seen in developing countries (Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). What is not clear is
why labor regulations should be so much costlier in a developing country setting, particularly
since enforcement agencies there are typically characterized by severe resource constraints,
low compliance and widespread corruption (Svensson (2005), Chatterjee and Kanbur (2013);
Kanbur and Ronconi (2015)). Moreover, previous work on the subject in developing countries
has focused almost exclusively on a small subset of labor regulations: namely, laws related
to employment protection (e.g. ﬁring restrictions) and minimum wages.2 In actuality, labor
regulations are multifaceted, encompassing many diﬀerent types of employment-related laws,
such as workplace safety requirements and the provision of mandated beneﬁts (including
health insurance, social security legislation, payment of gratuities, etc.). The vast majority
of such labor regulations have gone almost completely unstudied in developing countries.3
In this paper, we address both of these gaps and make several further contributions to the
growing literature on labor regulations in developing countries. In particular, we estimate
the costs associated with a suite of labor regulations in India whose components include
workplace safety regulations, social security taxes and business registration requirements.4
1See, for example, Besley and Burgess (2004a); Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2004); Djankov and Ramalho (2009).
2See Djankov and Ramalho (2009); Freeman (2010); Nataraj, Perez-Arce, Kumar, and Srinivasan (2014)
for excellent reviews of the literature which reveal this focus.
3We are aware of only a small number of exceptions, including Botero et al. (2004), Dougherty (2009),
and Dougherty, Frisancho, and Krishna (2014). However, non-minimum-wage, non-employment-protection
regulations are not the main focus of any of those studies, with Botero et al. (2004) focusing primarily
on the legal origins of regulation and Dougherty (2009) and Dougherty et al. (2014) principally interested
in employment protection legislation. The other two exceptions of which we are aware, Gruber (1995)
and Kugler and Kugler (2009), investigate the distortionary eﬀects of payroll taxes in Chile and Colombia,
respectively, but ﬁnd contradictory eﬀects.
4Business registration requirements are generally considered separately from labor regulations. However,
in our context labor regulations intended to apply to all ﬁrms are much more likely to be enforced once
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What the regulations have in common is that they only apply to ﬁrms that have hired 10
or more employees, a feature we exploit to identify the magnitude of the costs they impose
on ﬁrms. Because our methodology takes advantage of this objective feature of the laws, we
do not need to rely for identiﬁcation on inherently subjective assessments of diﬀerences in
the text of the laws across regions - a criticism which has dogged some of the best known
work in the literature (see Besley and Burgess (2004b), Bhattacharjea (2009) and Fagernas
(2010)).
Instead, our methodology translates observed ﬁrm behavior in response to the 10-worker
threshold into estimates of the increase in unit labor costs associated with these regulations.
Because our estimates are derived from ﬁrm behavior in response to actual enforcement
rather than from the text of the laws we refer to our estimated labor cost increase as repre-
senting “de facto regulatory costs” in what follows. We ﬁnd that these regulations eﬀectively
increase ﬁrms’ unit labor costs by 35%, substantially distorting economic decisions relative
to a counterfactual regime without these regulations. We also apply our method to India’s
most stringent, controversial piece of employment protection legislation, Chapter VB of the
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), which stipulates that any industrial establishment with more
than 100 workers (in most states) must obtain prior permision from the state government
before laying oﬀ workers or closing the establishment. In contrast to the substantial costs
we uncover at the 10-worker threshold, we ﬁnd only a small and statistically insigniﬁcant
impact on unit labor costs from operating at or above the 100-worker threshold.
The next major contribution of the paper is to show that the distortionary eﬀect of regu-
lations depends critically on quality of governance through the extent and type of corruption
present in regulatory enforcement. We distinguish between two diﬀerent types of corruption
in the context of regulatory enforcement: collusive and extortionary. Collusive corruption
is characterized by corrupt inspectors allowing ﬁrms to avoid the de jure costs of abiding
enforcement agencies have records of a ﬁrm’s existence obtained through registration. This view is consistent
with recent research experimentally defraying the costs of registration (de Mel, Mckenzie, and Woodruﬀ
(2013); de Andrade, Bruhn, and McKenzie (2014)), which ﬁnds that informal ﬁrms behave as if registration
imposes costs on them over and above the costs of registration alone.
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by regulations in exchange for bribes, while extortionary corruption is characterized by cor-
rupt inspectors who threaten to overreport regulatory infringements if they do not receive
bribes. By relating diﬀerences in our estimates of de facto regulatory costs to diﬀerences in
exposure to corruption across states and industries, we provide suggestive evidence that a)
corruption is a signiﬁcant determinant of regulatory costs, and b) regulatory corruption is
more extortionary than collusive in nature. This may explain why regulations appear to be
more costly in developing countries than in developed countries - it is not the regulations
themselves that are particularly problematic, but the way in which they are enforced.
We develop our argument as follows. We begin by exhibiting the Indian establishment
size distribution using data from the Economic Census of India (EC). Relatively underused
until recently, the EC aims to be a complete enumeration of all non-farm establishments5 in
India and, unlike all other Indian establishment-level datasets, it is not censored by size or
restricted to include only the formal or informal sector. It is thus the only Indian dataset
that permits estimation of the complete establishment size distribution - across all sizes
and types of ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that a power law distribution ﬁts the data well,6 except for a
discontinuous and proportional decrease in the density of establishments with 10 or more
workers (see Figure 2). We take this distortion of the establishment size distribution at
exactly the 10-worker threshold as qualitative evidence that the regulations which become
binding there do aﬀect ﬁrms’ hiring decisions.
To understand and quantify the eﬀect of the regulations on ﬁrm cost structure, we develop
a simple model in which managers are endowed with heterogenous productivities and must
choose their optimal employment levels. Firms that report hiring more than a threshold
number of workers face higher unit labor costs due to the presence of regulations, and are
5The EC refers to these as “entrepreneurial units” and deﬁnes them as any unit “engaged in the production
or distribution of goods or services other than for the sole purpose of own consumption.” As is common in
the literature, we occasionally refer to them as “ﬁrms” even though the unit of observation in the data is
actually a factory or an establishment, rather than a ﬁrm (i.e. multiple establishments may belong to the
same ﬁrm). We do this primarily for expositional purposes, but also based on the observation that only a
minute proportion of establishments belong to multi-establishment ﬁrms.
6This is not unusual. Establishment size distributions across the world have been shown to be well-ﬁt by
power law distributions (c.f. Axtell (2001); Herna´ndez-Pe´rez, Angulo-Brown, and Tun (2006)).
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thus smaller than they would be otherwise. Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2016)
(henceforth GLV) show that the magnitude of the increase in costs can be identiﬁed from
characteristics of the distribution including, most importantly, the size of the downshift in
density at the threshold. Our model augments GLV to allow for the possibility of strategic
misreporting. That is, managers may choose to deliberately misreport their employment
levels at some cost, with the goal of avoiding some or all of the additional labor costs that
apply to ﬁrms above the threshold size.7 Fitting the model’s predicted size distribution to
the one observed from the EC data, we generate an estimate of the additional labor costs
that apply to ﬁrms above the 10 worker regulatory threshold that is robust to the possibility
of strategic misreporting.
Although very large on average, we show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the
magnitude of de facto regulatory costs along several dimensions including state, industry
and ownership type. In the ﬁrst place, we ﬁnd that privately-owned establishments face the
highest de facto regulatory costs while government-owned establishments show no signiﬁcant
cost increase when employing 10 or more workers. This supports our interpretation that the
downshift in the distribution starting at 10 workers is due to the regulations as opposed to
some other factor.8 Most regulations do not apply to government-owned establishments in
the same way, so one would not expect their establishment size distribution to be distorted
over the 10-worker threshold. We then use the state and industry level variation to explore
other determinants of regulatory costs. Strikingly, we ﬁnd a strong and robust positive
correlation between our estimated regulatory costs and several diﬀerent state-level measures
of corruption.9 As further support for our state-level corruption results, we provide state-
by-industry analysis showing that industries with higher “regulatory intensity” have higher
7The importance of allowing for strategic misreporting is explained in greater detail in Section 4.2. Note
that “strategic misreporting” is distinct from the issue of corruption in the enforcement of labor regulations.
8We consider other factors in Section 4.2.
9These corruption measures include a subjective, perceptions-based measured of corruption from Trans-
parency International and a measure of the percentage of electricity that is lost in transmission and distribu-
tion as reported by the Reserve Bank of India (this latter measure has been used as a proxy for government
corruption and ineﬀectiveness in, for example, Kochhar, Kumar, Rajan, Subramanian, and Tokatlidis (2006)).
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estimated costs - especially when they are located in more corrupt states.
The link between high regulatory costs and corruption may appear surprising if one thinks
of corruption as collusive, “greasing the wheels” in a highly-regulated economy by allowing
ﬁrms to reduce their eﬀective regulatory burden by bribing inspectors (e.g., Huntington
(1968)). Our results are instead consistent with the concern that inspectors may overre-
port violations in order to extract greater bribes - extortionary corruption.10 We present a
simple model nesting extortionary and collusive corruption which explains the patterns we
see in the data. We provide additional support for our interpretation through qualitative
evidence from the crowd-sourced corruption reporting website ipaidabribe.com. The reports
on ipaidabribe.com describe regulatory inspectors threatening to overreport violations and
demanding bribes proportional to the number of workers employed in an establishment, just
as in our model.
Our ﬁnding that the most contentious component of India’s employment protection leg-
islation, Chapter VB of the IDA, does not have a substantial eﬀect on unit labor costs diﬀers
from much of the earlier academic work on the subject and belies the attention the IDA has
received from academics11 and the business press12 alike. We attribute this diﬀerence, ﬁrst,
to the fact that our methodology for estimating the impact of the legislation is very diﬀerent
from the strategies employed in previous papers. Speciﬁcally, our identiﬁcation is based on
the presence and size of distortions in the distribution of establishments at the size where
Chapter VB’s ﬁring restrictions become binding. Most previous work identiﬁes the eﬀect of
India’s employment protection legislation based on diﬀerences in the growth of mean out-
comes across states which have been coded as initiating pro-worker or pro-employer reforms
to the full IDA. The coding of states into these three groups (pro-employer, pro-worker, or
neutral) has been the subject of controversy in the subsequent literature (see Fagernas (2010);
10See Banerjee (1994); Mookherjee (1997); Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo (1999); Polinsky and Shavell
(2001); Mishra and Mookherjee (2013) for theoretical treatments. Empirically, Sequeira and Djankov (2014)
and Asher and Novosad (2016) also provide evidence for the importance of extortionary corruption.
11See, for example, Besley and Burgess (2004a); Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2007); Aghion, Burgess,
Redding, and Zilibotti (2008); Adhvaryu, Chari, and Sharma (2013); Chaurey (2015).
12E.g. Bajaj (2011), Ghosh (2016).
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Bhattacharjea (2006, 2009)), and an advantage of our identiﬁcation strategy is that we can
side-step this controversy. Hsieh and Olken (2014), the only other paper in the literature to
focus on establishment size distributions, report ﬁnding no visually striking change in the
size distribution of Indian establishments at the 100-worker threshold, in accordance with
our quantitative results. Another source of diﬀerence is our focus on Chapter VB, rather
than the full IDA. This is partially a question of the feasibility of applying our approach
(Chapter VB is size-based), but we also see focusing on Chapter VB as providing a proof of
concept. If Chapter VB’s complete restriction on ﬁring is not very distortionary, it would
be surprising if the law’s more mild provisions are.
In addition to our contributions to the empirical literature on labor regulations, our
extension of the GLV model to allow ﬁrms to strategically misreport their sizes should ﬁnd
applications in many other settings. Robustness to strategic misreporting in response to a
size threshold is particularly crucial in developing countries because costs of such behavior
are likely to be much lower than in the high-income country administrative data used by
studies such as GLV. The information in the EC is self-reported - as it is in nearly all
developing country datasets - and it is likely that enumerators are co-optible at relatively low
cost. We show that in the presence of strategic misreporting, a naive approach to estimating
GLV’s model can dramatically overestimate the increase in labor costs associated with a size-
based regulation. We identify ﬁrms’ real responses using a reasonable theoretical restriction:
that the cost of misreporting be strictly convex in the degree of misreporting. Under this
assumption, misreporting can be extensive near the threshold, but becomes increasingly
costly for large values. In fact, we show that the reported ﬁrm size distribution becomes
arbitrarily close to the true distribution at large ﬁrm sizes, so one can minimize any bias in
the estimate of regulatory costs by focusing the estimation on large ﬁrm sizes and discarding
the observations close to the threshold. In our case, if one fails to account for the possibility
of misreporting, the estimated increase in per-worker costs rises from 35% to 101%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section (Section 2), we provide
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an overview of the relevant institutional details regarding Indian labor and industrial regula-
tions. Section 3 introduces the data and provides qualitative evidence on the importance of
size-based regulations using the size distribution of establishments in India. In Section 4 we
describe the theoretical model and empirical strategy. Section 5 provides the main results.
In Section 6, we interpret the ﬁndings, explore the multiple dimensions of variation in our
results, and investigate the connection between our estimated costs and corruption. Section
7 concludes.
2 Labor Regulations in India
Most labor regulations in India only apply to establishments that are larger than a certain
threshold, where size is most often measured in terms of the number of workers in the
establishment. There are several thresholds at which diﬀerent labor regulations start to
apply, but the two most prominent thresholds occur once an establishment hires at least 10
and at least 100 workers.13 In most states in India, establishments that hire more than 100
workers must abide by India’s most controversial piece of employment protection legislation:
Chapter VB of the IDA.14 Under this regulation, establishments over the threshold must
be granted government permission before closing the establishment or laying oﬀ workers. It
is the IDA - of which Chapter VB is a part - that has been the subject of most academic
papers on labor regulations in India. Outside of India, employment protection legislation
more generally - along with minimum wage policy - has been the subject of nearly all research
on labor regulations in developing countries.
In contrast, the 10 worker threshold has received far less attention from academics, even
though it is extremely important due to the large number of varied regulations that start to
13There are other thresholds, such as at 20 workers (at which point establishments must contribute to the
“Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation,” which operates a pension scheme for formal sector workers) and
at 50 workers (at which point severance payment obligations increase under Chapter VA of the Industrial
Disputes Act), but we do not analyze these thresholds because they are less contentious and do not appear
to substantially distort the establishment size distribution.
14In 2005, the year to which our analysis applies, this threshold was 100 workers for all states except West
Bengal, where the threshold was 50 workers.
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become binding at that threshold as well as the fact that this threshold is most commonly
associated with the formal/informal divide. The major regulations that start to apply once
an establishment employs 10 or more workers include the following: establishments must
register with the government, meet various workplace safety requirements (under the Fac-
tories Act for manufacturing establishments that use power and The Building and Other
Construction Workers’ Act for construction-related establishments, for example), pay insur-
ance/social security taxes (under the Employees’ State Insurance Act), distribute gratuities
(under the Payment of Gratuity Act) and they must bear a greater administrative bur-
den (under, for example, the Labor Laws Act). Other regulations are indirectly size-based,
because they reference laws with size-based aspects. For example, the Maternity Beneﬁts
Act only applies to establishments designated as “factories” under the Factories Act, which
means it only applies to establishments with more than 10 workers.15
In addition to - or in lieu of - the explicit costs associated with complying with the regu-
lations, establishments with 10 or more workers may be subject to implicit costs associated
with increased interaction with labor inspectors, who often have the power to extract bribes
and tighten (or ease) the administrative burden ﬁrms face. Indeed, inspectors in India have
a large amount of discretion regarding the enforcement of administrative law. For example,
in some cases, the deﬁnition of what constitutes a “day” is at the discretion of the inspec-
tor, and it is a commonly held view that “[w]hile grave violations are ignored, minor errors
become a scope for harassment” (TeamLease Services (2006)).
It has been argued that the ability to extract bribes is exacerbated by the antiquated
and/or arbitrary nature of certain components of the laws (Debroy (2013)). TeamLease
Services (2006) provides some telling examples: “[r]ules under the Factories Act, framed in
1948,16 provide for white washing of factories. Distemper won’t do. Earthen pots ﬁlled with
15Finally, there appears to be a salience eﬀect associated with the 10 worker threshold as well: in interviews
with small business owners in Chennai, we discovered that several of them appeared to believe that certain
regulations (such as the Provident Fund Act) applies once you have 10 workers, when in fact they did not.
16The Factories Act itself dates to 1948, but the origins of the law go back another 100 years at least, to
Britain’s ﬁrst Factory Acts.
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water are required. Water coolers won’t suﬃce. Red-painted buckets ﬁlled with sand are
required. Fire extinguishers won’t do... And so on.” The result of such rules is that almost
all ﬁrms can be found guilty of some violation or another under the letter of the law - even
if they are in compliance with the spirit of the law. Firm owners who choose not to comply
with such regulations face costs if discovered and convicted.17
This kind of behavior has been referred to as “harassment bribery” (Basu (2011)). Anec-
dotal evidence of inspectors using the complexity, arbitrariness and sheer amount of paper-
work as a way to extract bribes is easy to come by. For example, we have included a selection
of citizen reports from “ipaidabribe.com” in Appendix A, which demonstrate just this kind
of behavior.18 Interestingly, some of the reports suggest that the size of the bribe paid is a
direct linear function of the number of employees - which will be relevant for interpretation
of our results in Section 6.
3 Data and the Size Distribution in India
3.1 Data
We will use the Economic Census of India (EC) as our main data source to investigate the
costs associated with the regulations described in the previous section. The EC is meant to
be a complete enumeration of all (formal and informal) non-farm business establishments in
India at a given time. As such, it contains a very large number of units: the 2005 wave, which
we will principally use, has almost 42 million observations. It is the only Indian dataset
that represents the unconditional distribution of establishment size, which is essential for
our analysis. Other datasets, such as the CMIE’s Prowess Database, the Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI) or the National Sample Survey’s (NSS) Unorganized Manufacturing Surveys
cover only certain parts of the distribution and are thus unsuitable for our analysis. The
17The possible costs include ﬁnes and/or prison sentences.
18We thank Andrew Foster for this suggestion.
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ASI, for example, only covers establishments in the manufacturing sector that have registered
with the government under the Factories Act. However, registration under this Act is only
required for establishments with 10 or more workers if the unit uses power (20 or more
workers if the establishment uses no power). Therefore, the selection into the ASI varies
discontinuously at precisely one of our points of interest.
Little used until recently, the EC has seen substantially more use in the literature in the
past several years (e.g. Asher and Novosad (2015a,b, 2016); Bertrand, Hsieh, and Tsivanidis
(2015)). Asher and Novosad (2016) provides a comparison of the EC and ASI). The price
to pay for uniform coverage and large sample size is that the EC does not contain very
detailed information on each observation. For each establishment in the data, there is only
information on a handful of variables including the total number of workers usually working,
the number of non-hired workers (such as family members working alongside the owner), the
registration status, the 4-digit NIC industry code, the type of ownership (private, govern-
ment, etc) and the source of funds for the establishment. There is no information on capital,
output or proﬁts, and the data are cross-sectional.
We supplement our analysis with data from a variety of other sources. From the ASI we
get employment and labor productivity in the registered manufacturing sector. We generate
those same variables for the unregistered sector with data from the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation (MOSPI) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). We get data on
state and industry level corruption from a) Transparency International’s “India Corruption
Study 2005”, b) the RBI, and c) the World Bank Enterprise Survey for India (2005). Data
on state-level regulatory enforcement come from the Indian Labour Year Book.19 Other
measures of state-level regulations come from Aghion et al. (2008) and Dougherty (2009).
19We would like to thank Anushree Sinha and Avantika Prabhakar for their considerable and generous
help in obtaining these data.
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3.2 The Size Distribution of Establishments in India
Figure 1 shows the distribution of establishments by the number of total workers (hired and
non-hired - typically family - workers) for establishments with up to 200 total workers in
2005. Perhaps the most striking feature of ﬁgure 1 is the extraordinary degree to which
the distribution is right-skewed. Indeed, about half of all establishments are single person
establishments, while the densities for establishments with 10 or more workers are almost im-
perceptible.20 Figure 2 shows the full distribution of establishment size frequencies according
to a log scale. Each point represents one bar in the earlier histogram.
Three things are most striking about ﬁgure 2. First, the natural log of the density is
a linear function of the natural log of the number of total workers. This implies that the
unlogged distribution follows a power law in the number of total workers. This pattern will
be important for the analysis that follows but it is not very surprising in and of itself: power
law distributions in ﬁrm sizes have been documented in many countries (e.g. Axtell (2001)
and Herna´ndez-Pe´rez et al. (2006)). The second and more unique feature of the distribution
is that there appears to be a level shift downward in the log frequency for establishment
sizes greater than or equal to 10. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper to
document this phenomenon in India. Finally, we do not see any discernible change in the
distribution at 100 workers, the relevant threshold for employment protection legislation.
We will conﬁrm this fact in our formal analysis.
Also of note from the ﬁgures above is that there appears to be a signiﬁcant amount of
non-classical measurement error due to rounding of establishment sizes to multiples of 5.
The existence of rounding is not surprising given that the data are self-reported and that
respondents are asked to give the “number of persons usually working [over the last year]”.
Our estimation procedure, described in the next section, accommodates this measurement
error pattern.
20The densities for establishments with more than 200 workers are also imperceptible. We have omitted
them only for clarity in the ﬁgure.
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4 Model and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Basic Model
To interpret the downward shift from Figure 2 in economic terms, we ﬁrst describe the
framework developed in GLV on which our model is built. In the GLV framework, size-
based regulations increase the unit labor costs of ﬁrms that exceed the size threshold, which
results in a parallel downward shift in part of the theoretical ﬁrm size distribution. From
the magnitude of the downshift observed in the empirical distribution, one can back out the
additional labor costs imposed by the regulations.
The primitive object in the GLV framework is the distribution of managerial ability (↵ ⇠
φ : [↵, ↵max]! R) as the primitive object, as in Lucas (1978). Firms whose managers have
higher ability (↵) are more productive and can proﬁtably employ more workers. Workers are
allocated to ﬁrms through a competitive labor market with a single, market clearing wage. As
is common in the literature, GLV assume that the distribution of managerial ability follows
a power law (e.g. φ(↵) = cα↵
−βα), an assumption we will maintain. This generates a power
law in the theoretical ﬁrm size distribution. A ﬁrm/manager with productivity/managerial




where n is the number of workers a ﬁrm employs, f(n) is a production function (with
f 0(n) > 0 and f 00(n) < 0), w is a constant wage paid to all workers, and ⌧¯ takes the
value 1 if n  N and 1 + ⌧ if n > N , where ⌧ > 0 is a proportional tax on labor. From
the ﬁrst order condition on this maximization problem, ↵ = wτ
f
0 (n)
, one can see that higher
productivity establishments/managers will employ more workers, and that ﬁrms which cross
the threshold (N) and must therefore pay higher labor costs will hire fewer workers than
they would otherwise.
One can characterize the solution as follows. First, only individuals with managerial
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ability/productivity above some threshold (↵min) will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to manage a ﬁrm.
Individuals with ↵ < ↵min will be workers and receive payoﬀ equal to w. The set of managers
can be further categorized, beginning with the lowest productivity managers (those with
↵ 2 [↵min, ↵1]). One can think of these managers as unconstrained in the sense that they
choose to hire fewer than N workers and thus do not fall under the purview of the size-
based labor regulations. Another set of managers with slightly higher productivity (between
some thresholds ↵1 and ↵2) maximize their proﬁts by hiring N workers exactly to avoid the
discontinuous increase in costs implied by crossing the threshold. These mangers should be
“bunched up” at N . By the same token, this should lead the ﬁrm size distribution to exhibit
a hole or “valley”, just to the right of the threshold, because the ﬁrms that would otherwise
be there are instead bunched up at N . The last set of managers are those with high enough
productivity (↵ > ↵2) that it is not worth it to avoid the regulation and so they choose to
exceed the threshold and pay the tax. However, these managers face higher marginal costs
than they would in the absence of the regulation and therefore employ fewer workers by a
constant proportion (resulting in a “downshift” in the logged ﬁrm size distribution).
The distribution of ﬁrm size, χ(n), can be recovered as a transformation of the distribu-
tion of managerial ability, φ(↵), since the ﬁrst-order conditions on the ﬁrms’ maximization
problems imply a strictly monotonic relationship between ↵ and n (except for the bunching).
We obtain χ(n) in closed form under the further assumption that the production function is
a power function: f(n) = nθ. Then we obtain the key result that a function of the tax enters
multiplicatively in the expression for the density of ﬁrm size n (for all n > N). Therefore,
the function of the tax enters additively in the log density for all ﬁrms large enough to be
subject to the tax.
Formally, the density of ﬁrms with n total workers, χ(n) is given by:21
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(2)
where ✓ measures the degree of diminishing returns to scale, β represents the negative slope
of the power law and ⌧ is the implicit per worker tax. The range [N, nu] represents the
“hole” in the distribution where the ﬁrms bunched up at N would otherwise be found. For
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β−1
1−θ )1{n > N}. (3)
To see how ⌧ is identiﬁed from χ(n), rewrite Equation 3 as
log(χ(n)) = ↵− β log(n) + δ {n > N}. (4)
↵, β and δ can be identiﬁed by applying Equation 4 to the observed size distribution. ✓ is




which is identiﬁed as long as ✓ and β are identiﬁed.
A researcher might therefore be tempted to choose nu and produce a value for ⌧ by using
ordinary least squares to estimate the speciﬁcation
log(χ(n)) = ↵− β log(n) + δ {n > N}+ ✏(n) (5)
where ✏(n) represents any deviation of the observed ﬁrm size distribution from the model
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coming from an idiosyncratic tendency for ﬁrms to cluster to or away from a particular size.
But what if the true ﬁrm size distribution is systematically diﬀerent from what is observed
in the data? In the next subsection we show that when ﬁrms can misreport their size in
response to the regulatory threshold, estimating Equation 5 can lead one to arrive at an
upward-biased estimate of ⌧ .22
4.2 Strategic Misreporting
One of the underlying assumptions of the analysis above is that any deviation of the true
distribution of ﬁrm size is unrelated to the regulatory threshold N . This might be a reason-
able assumption when working with high quality administrative data in a developed country
setting as in GLV, but the data in the Economic Census (as in most developing country
datasets) are self-reported, and it is possible that establishment managers may deliberately
misreport information to Economic Census enumerators. For example, if the managers are
aware of the increased regulatory burden that is associated with employing 10 or more work-
ers, and if they believe the EC enumerators will relay information to government regulatory
bodies,23 they may wish to hide the fact that their actual employment exceeds the threshold
or more generally under-report their actual employment. In what follows, we show how
misreporting generates a reported distribution that diﬀers from the true distribution of em-
ployment and discuss the biases this diﬀerence may produce in the value of ⌧ estimated using
Equation 5 along with presenting our own solution.
Our model extends the basic GLV framework by letting ﬁrms choose not only their true
employment (n), but also their reported employment (l). Then, a ﬁrm with productivity ↵
22This conclusion also holds when using the maximum likelihood estimator from GLV or the restricted
least squares speciﬁcation from Appendix B of the NBER working paper version of GLV, Garicano, Lelarge,
and Van Reenen (2013). We focus on Equation 5 for expositional simplicity and because we believe it is
more likely to be implemented by researchers since it can easily be estimated using any standard regression
package.
23In point of fact ﬁrms’ answers to Economic Census enumerators have no impact on their regulatory
burden, but it is quite possible that ﬁrms believe otherwise, and that is what is relevant. If ﬁrms believe
that that reporting has no eﬀect on their regulatory burden, then there should be no incentive to misreport,
and estimates based on Equation 5 would be unbiased.
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faces the following proﬁt-maximization problem:
⇡(↵) = max
n,l
↵f(n)− wn− ⌧wl ⇤ {l > N} − F (n, l) ⇤ p(n, l) (6)
where ↵, f(n), w and ⌧ are all deﬁned as they were previously. The problem is identical
except that now ﬁrms pay the extra marginal cost, ⌧w, only on their reported employment,
and not on their true employment. Furthermore, they only pay this cost if their reported
employment exceeds the threshold. There is now an incentive for ﬁrms to misreport their
employment in a downward direction (i.e. to set l < n).
Counteracting this incentive is that misreporting ﬁrms may be caught by the authorities
with probability p(n, l), and made subject to a ﬁne, F (n, l).24 As written above, both the
probability of being caught and the magnitude of the ﬁne may in general depend on n and
l in an arbitrary way, but going forward we will impose the following assumption on the
expected costs of misreporting:
Assumption 1. Let u ⌘ n− l ≥ 0 denote the degree of misreporting and M(u) = F (u)⇤p(u)
denote the expected costs of misreporting. We assume that M(u) is continuous, increasing,
strictly convex and that M(0) = 0.
We restrict u to be positive as there is no incentive for ﬁrms to over-report their employ-
ment. The assumption that misreporting costs should be convex in the degree of misreporting
is both standard in the literature (e.g. Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2015); Kumler, Ver-
hoogen, and Frias (2015)) and intuitive given our understanding of the context in which
Indian businesses make such decisions.25 One important implication of Assumption 1 - that
the extent of misreporting should be relatively lower for larger ﬁrms - ﬁnds empirical support
24Again it is the ﬁrm’s perception that they may be caught that matters.
25The intuition is that hiding larger and larger numbers of employees from enumerators or inspectors
should get increasingly diﬃcult until at some point it is impossible. This intuition is supported by our
understanding of the context in which ﬁrms make such decisions, which has been informed by interviews
with small businesses in Chennai. Among such enterprises it is common to hear accounts of business owners
ushering employees out the back door of the establishment whenever labor inspectors arrive, but this type of
behavior is clearly only possible for relatively small numbers of employees. We would like to thank Sharon
Buteau and Balasekhar Sudalaimani from IFMR for helping to set up these interviews.
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in recent literature (e.g. Goyette and Kouame (2016)).
One plausible way to obtain strictly convex misreporting costs is to suppose that misre-
porting ﬁrms are caught with a probability that is itself an increasing and strictly convex
function of the degree of misreporting, n− l, and subject to a ﬁxed ﬁne if caught. Another
possibility is that the probability of being caught is linearly increasing in the degree of mis-
reporting and the ﬁne if caught is also a linear function of misreporting. But whatever the
functional forms of p(·) and F (·), as long as M(u) satisﬁes the conditions of Assumption 1,
we show that for a given size x, the diﬀerence between the log of the reported density,  (x),
and the log of the true density, χ(x), becomes vanishingly small for large enough values of
x.
Proposition 1. Suppose a ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem takes the form of Equation 6
and Assumption 1 holds. Then
lim
x!1
logχ(x)− log (x) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
To provide some intuition for this result, suppose that misreporting ﬁrms are caught with
















The solution to this problem can be informally characterized as follows.26 The lowest produc-
tivity ﬁrms (those with ↵ below some threshold, ↵1) will be unconstrained, choosing n  N
and reporting truthfully (l = n). Higher productivity ﬁrms, with ↵ 2 [↵1, ↵2], will choose
n > N , exceeding the regulatory threshold, but will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to misreport their
26For simplicity we focus below on an interior solution, which is guaranteed if the parameters satisfy the
following condition: wτ
F
< 2. This condition is not necessary for any of our results.
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employment, setting l = N . These ﬁrms will only appear to be bunched up at N , but will in
fact have higher employment. The last category of ﬁrms are those with ↵ > ↵2, which are
productive enough to warrant hiring work forces so large that they cannot completely avoid
the regulation without being detected with reasonable probability and must report l > N .
Even these ﬁrms, however, with both n > N and l > N do not ﬁnd it proﬁt-maximizing to
report truthfully. They can save on their unit labor costs by shading their reported employ-
ment, and will choose l = n − 50
F
w⌧ . Note that the degree of misreporting is by a constant
amount, rather than a constant proportion.27





logA− βlog(n) if n 2 [nmin, N)
log[⇠(n)] if n 2 [N, nm(↵2)]
− if n 2 (nm(↵2), nt(↵2))
logA− β−1
1−θ
log(1 + ⌧)− βlog(n) if n ≥ nt(↵2)
(7)




logA− βlog(l) if l 2 [lmin, N)
log(δl) if l = N
− if l 2 (N, lt(↵2))
logA− β−1
1−θ
log(1 + ⌧)− βlog(l + 50
F
w⌧) if l ≥ lt(↵2)
where A is a function of constants and terms have been simpliﬁed and collected.28
Comparing the expressions for the reported and true size distributions above, there are
several points worth noting. First, for the range l < N , the true distribution coincides
with the reported/observed distribution. Second, there appears to be bunching at N in
the reported distribution, but some of these ﬁrms in fact have greater than N workers.
27This will be the case for any misreporting cost function satisfying Assumption 1.
28Derivation of this result can be found in Appendix B.2.
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Third, compared to the distribution for n < N , both the true distribution and the reported
distribution for n ≫ N are downshifted, and by exactly the same function of ⌧ as in the
model without misreporting (the intercepts for both distributions are logA− β−1
1−θ
log(1+⌧) for
larger ﬁrms versus logA for smaller ﬁrms). Fourth, as stated in Proposition 1, the diﬀerence
between the log of the reported distribution and the log of the true distribution converges to
0 for large ﬁrms. The intuition is straightforward: the only diﬀerence in the two expressions
is the constant amount 50
F
w⌧ , the contribution of which becomes negligible at large sizes.
Proposition 1 is problematic for estimating the parameters of the model using Equation
5. In practice, Equation 5 must be estimated using data from relatively small establishments
with sizes outside the range [N, nu]. This is because the empirical probability of observing
an establishment of a given size is truncated at 1
# of observations
, which is apparent visually
in ﬁgure 2. Truncation makes the relationship between the log of the empirical probability
and the log of the total number of workers nonlinear. To preserve the linear relationship,
a researcher would have to omit establishment sizes large enough that truncation is not an
issue.29 However, Proposition 1 tells us that the misreported distribution is close to the
true distribution only at large sizes and that the misreported distribution may be biased
downward at establishment sizes close to a regulatory threshold. This leads to downward
bias in δ (the downshift in the log density) and consequently upward bias in ⌧ . Instead, we
will develop an estimation strategy that deals with the truncation problem and allows us to
focus on large ﬁrms, where the the diﬀerence between the log of the reported distribution
and the log of the true distribution is close to zero.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting a second possible source of misreporting: Economic
Census enumerators themselves. EC enumerators were required to ﬁll out an extra form con-
taining the address of any establishment that reported 10 or more workers. It is conceivable
that enumerators might have found it preferable to under-report the number of workers for
establishments with 10 or more workers in order to avoid the extra burden of ﬁlling in the
29The suggestion to focus on relatively smaller establishments appears in Appendix B of Garicano et al.
(2013).
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“Address Slip”. However, as we show in Appendix B.4, this type of misreporting - like the
previous one - only generates bias in the reported distribution for establishment sizes close to
N .30 In fact, it is easy to show that any estimation technique that is robust to the possibility
of manager-driven misreporting will also be robust to the possibility of enumerator-driven
misreporting.
4.3 An Empirical Approach Robust to Strategic Misreporting
In this subsection, we develop a way of estimating Equation 5 using establishments that
are least aﬀected by the misreporting. These include establishments that are below the
bunching point as well as those that are far above the size threshold. As we remarked in
the previous subsection, we cannot estimate Equation 5 directly on large establishments
because of truncation in the empirical probability of observing an establishment of a given
size. Furthermore, as discussed in section 3, the empirical size distribution is characterized
by substantial rounding to multiples of 5 workers, especially at larger sizes. Setting aside
the truncation problem, OLS estimation of Equation 5 will produce downward bias in δ
because sizes that are multiples of 5 are treated as single observations. Instead, their excess
establishments should be distributed to nearby sizes.
To address both issues, we non-parametrically estimate the density associated with larger
sizes using the method described in Markovitch and Krieger (2000) (MK). MK propose a
nonparametric density estimator for heavy-tailed distributions that achieves L1 consistency












to a transformation, T : R ! [0, 1], of the data. We use an Epanechnikov kernel and the
30The two types of misreporting can be modeled similarly. The main diﬀerence is that the marginal beneﬁt
of misreporting in the manager-driven misreporting model is replaced with a ﬁxed beneﬁt of misreporting
in the enumerator-driven misreporting model.
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With the density estimates for the transformed data in hand, we convert back to density
estimates for the original data using the transformation:
 ˆ(l) = fˆ(T (l))T 0(l).
The advantage of this approach from our perspective is that a constant bandwidth31 applied
to the transformed data expands asymmetrically with respect to the original data. As we
move to the right in the distribution our kernel begins to put positive weight on observations
farther away, all the more so in the right of the distribution where data are scarcer. This
accords with our observation that rounding in the reported distribution becomes more severe
at larger sizes. We use the empirical probability for small sizes, where the establishment size
distribution is better represented as a discrete variable.
We note here one diﬀerence between the model and the data. The model generates the log
density of reported employment in 7. The log density is undeﬁned for l 2 (N, lt(↵2)) because
the density of reported employment contains a hole in this region. Reporting l 2 (N, lt(↵2))
is dominated by choosing either l = N or l ≥ lt(↵2). However, Figures 1 and 2 clearly show
that there are ﬁrms who report employing 11 workers. As in Kleven and Waseem (2013),
we consider a fraction of ﬁrms to be inattentive to the threshold. That is, managers must
pay a ﬁxed cost which varies across ﬁrms to adjust their reported and actual employment in
response to the threshold. In practice this would involve hiring an accountant or attorney
who is knowledgable about the text of labor regulations. Under the plausible assumption
that the distribution of ﬁxed costs does not vary with ﬁrm size, the fact that beneﬁts of
31Note that in this case, the bandwidth must be chosen. We cannot use cross-validation to choose the
optimal bandwidth because it will recover the rounding pattern found in the data.
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adjusting employment in response to the threshold rise with size means that all large ﬁrms
will adjust while only some small ﬁrms will. Our approach of basing estimation primarily on
ﬁrms with employment levels far from N is robust also to this rationally inattentive behavior.
We apply a modiﬁed version of Equation 5 to the log of the estimated density  ˆ(l) for
all observed sizes. For example, when analysing the eﬀect of regulations applying to ﬁrms
employing 10 or more workers, we remove the eﬀect of misreporting close to the threshold
by adding dummy variables for size 8 and 9 and for sizes 10 - 20. The choice of 20 as the
largest size for which we include a dummy is unimportant. Since Equation 5 treats each
establishment size as one observation, the model is primarily estimated using data far from
the 10-worker cutoﬀ.32 Finally, we include dummies for having 1 or 2 workers because own
account and 2-worker establishments are likely to be household enterprises and may therefore
diﬀer fundamentally in character from their larger counterparts.
Figure 3 depicts the strategy. The dark grey dots show the raw data. The light grey
dots represent the result of the ﬁrst step: nonparametric density estimates associated with
each establishment size. The line shows the ﬁt of the model in Equation 5, augmented by
the dummy variables, to the nonparametric density estimates. Figure 3 above provides some
evidence for the model described in section 4.2. The observed establishment size distribution
appears to converge back to a power law with the same slope as for establishments with fewer
than 10 workers, but deviates slightly from that slope at sizes just above the 10-worker cutoﬀ.
In the next section we report the results of the estimation.
5 Results
5.1 Regulations Applying to Firms Employing 10+ Workers
In this section we report the results of applying the estimation procedure described above to
the 10 worker threshold in the 2005 Economic Census of India. Recall that the regulations
32The largest establishment in the 2005 EC has 22,901 workers.
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applying to ﬁrms with 10 or more workers were of the type less-studied in the literature:
workplace safety regulations, mandatory beneﬁts and registration requirements bringing with
them the threat of increased regulatory enforcement. Table 1 reports estimates for the
increase in per-worker costs associated with these regulations, ⌧ , at the all-India level and
for a selection of states, industries and ownership types. Estimates for all states, industries
and ownership types are reported in Appendix C. Standard errors, displayed beside the
point estimates in parentheses, are obtained from a clustered bootstrap procedure with 200
replications. Following GLV, we cluster by industry at the 4 digit NIC code level. This
allows for the possibility that diﬀerences in production technology - which could aﬀect the
ﬁrm size distribution and therefore our estimates - may be correlated by industry.33 The top
panel of Table 1 gives the all-India estimate of ⌧ using our methodology. The point estimate
is .35 and is signiﬁcant at the < 1% level. This means that, on average, establishments in
India that hire more than 9 workers act as though they must pay additional labor costs of
35% of the wage per additional worker.
By contrast, estimating the model without accounting for misreporting in any way yields
much larger estimates. In particular, estimating Equation 5 on the size distribution omitting
sizes larger than 99 workers and including the same dummy variables as in our own speciﬁca-
tion would lead us to conclude that exceeding the 10-worker threshold increases per-worker
costs by 101%. This is due to a combination of rounding and the fact that the density
associated with establishment sizes 21 - 99 converges only slowly back to the downshifted
power law it follows at larger sizes, as predicted in our misreporting model. In other words,
a “naive” estimation puts undue weight on ﬁrm sizes whose densities are biased downward
by misreporting. In what follows we will focus our discussion on our misreporting-robust
estimates of ⌧ .
33For robustness we have also tried alternative procedures, including a wild bootstrap and non-parametric
bootstrap - both clustered at the ﬁrm size level. Clustering in this fashion allows for the possibility that
reporting errors may be correlated by size and provide the most conservative approach to inference (especially
the latter procedure). Under these procedures, statistical signiﬁcance of our All-India estimates and estimates
for most large states and industries survive (although some are only signiﬁcant at the 10% level under the
latter procedure).
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The lower panels of Table 1 show substantial variation in the magnitude of our misreporting-
robust estimates of the per-worker tax by State, Industry and Ownership Type. For example,
the point estimate on ⌧ for the State of Kerala is .14 and is not statistically signiﬁcant, while
the estimate for Bihar, on the other hand, is .70 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, implying that establishments in Bihar act as though they must pay a tax of 70% of
the wage for each additional worker they hire past 9 workers.
We also observe substantial diﬀerences in the size of ⌧ by industry: it appears that the
eﬀective tax is high for establishments in manufacturing and even higher for establishments
in retail and wholesale trade. Some industries have very noisy estimates, at times producing
negative point estimates for ⌧ . This is also true of some of the smaller states and ownership
categories (as one can see in Appendix C), and is explained by the fact that the power law
relationship can break down when there are a small number of observations in a category - as
is the case for electricity, gas and water. In a few cases, negative point estimates reﬂect the
fact that the production and market characteristics of these industries vary greatly from our
model so that our model provides a poor ﬁt of the data.34 When looking at the diﬀerences
by ownership type, we ﬁnd that the estimates for ⌧ are highest for private ﬁrms (particularly
unincorporated proprietorships, which form by far the largest category of private ﬁrms). As
one might expect, the tax is insigniﬁcant for government-owned ﬁrms, where presumably the
regulatory burden is less than in the private sector.
The results above derive from the 2005 Economic Census, but we have also used data
from the 1998 Economic Census to test whether there is inter-temporal variation in regu-
latory costs. Using the same empirical methodology described in Section 4.1, we estimate
⌧ at the All-India level to be equal to .48 (.12) in the earlier data. Although somewhat
larger in magnitude, this is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from our 2005 estimate.35
34Andhra Pradesh, the largest state to show a negative point estimate for τ , has a size distribution distorted
in ways that are diﬀerent from all other states, and which produces a poor ﬁt (ﬁgure available upon request).
We have concluded that this is the result of errors in data collection or recording rather than deliberate
misreporting.
35Relatedly, estimates of τ based on an alternative dataset comprised of the 2005/6 ASI and the 2005/6
NSSO Unorganized Manufacturing Enterprises Survey are also similar to our estimate of τ using the 2005
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Interestingly, the downshift in the 1998 ﬁrm size distribution is not as immediately visually
striking as that observed in the 2005 data, which may well reﬂect the fact that incentives
related to misreporting - either on the part of ﬁrms or enumerators - were diﬀerent in the
two time periods, for example due to the Address Slip reporting requirement added in 2005.
Let us reiterate, however, that our analysis in Section 4.1 shows that incentives to misreport
do not aﬀect our estimates of ⌧ .
5.2 Employment Protection Legislation
In this subsection we report the results obtained by using our empirical strategy to test for
an increase in per-worker costs for establishments that hire more than 100 workers and thus
fall under the ambit of Chapter VB of the IDA, the most stringent component of India’s
employment protection legislation. As before, we run the test on the 2005 Economic Census
and report the standard error in parentheses.36 One diﬀerence in the estimation procedure
is that we include dummy variables for ﬁrm sizes 1 to 20, so we are eﬀectively comparing the
distribution from 21 to 99 with that from 100 onwards. We include the dummies from 1 to
9 because we do not want to conﬂate the eﬀect of the 100 worker threshold with that of the
10 worker threshold, and we include the dummies from 10 to 20 because those values will be
most contaminated by misreporting - as implied by our model. The results are shown in the
table below and largely conform to what the ﬁgures in Section 3 informally suggest: there is
little evidence of a downshift. The implied ⌧ is only .04 and is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Chapter VB of the IDA does not therefore appear to have an adverse eﬀect on the unit labor
costs of ﬁrms.37
EC.
36The standard error is obtained in an identical way as previously - from a bootstrap procedure with 200
replications, clustered at the 4 digit NIC code level.
37Note that our procedure is only capable of capturing distortions in the unit labor costs of ﬁrms, as those
are the only ones that would show up as a downshift in the log ﬁrm size distribution. If the IDA imposes
ﬁxed costs, our procedure will not detect them. GLV identify ﬁxed costs from bunching at N , but this is
not possible for us because reported bunching may not reﬂect actual bunching, as discussed in Section 4.2.
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6 Discussion and Investigation of Mechanisms
In the previous section we documented considerable variation in our estimates of the costs (⌧)
of regulations applying to ﬁrms employing 10 or more workers across states, industries and
ownership types. In this section we explore the determinants of this variation and see whether
it can be explained by diﬀerences in the substance or application of regulations across states
and industries.38 Finding that diﬀerences in regulatory substance or enforcement do help
explain the variation in ⌧ provides further support for our assumption that the observed
downshift in the distribution of establishments with 10 or more workers is indeed due to
the existence of size-based regulations. Furthermore, the variation in ⌧ helps us understand
which dimensions of the regulatory regime impose the greatest costs on ﬁrms.
To preview the results, we observe a signiﬁcant correlation between our estimated costs
(⌧) and measures of the extent to which states have reformed the role of inspectors in their
regulatory regimes. This ﬁnding motivates us to look next at the link between ⌧ and state
level corruption, which we also ﬁnd to be strong, robust to diﬀerent measures of corruption,
and independent of measures of regulatory substance. We take this ﬁnding to suggest that
it is not only the regulations themselves but also their enforcement and application that is
responsible for the high costs we estimate.
The ﬁnding that corruption increases regulatory costs may appear counter-intuitive given
that some of the literature on regulations and corruption (e.g. Khan, Khwaja, and Olken
(2015)) has emphasized the role corruption may play in reducing regulatory burden. In this
conceptualization, ﬁrms bribe inspectors to underreport violations. However, as we show in
subsection 6.3, if one allows for the possibility that inspectors can extort ﬁrms by threatening
to impose large ﬁnes for technical violations, the relationship between regulatory burden and
corruption becomes theoretically ambiguous and can easily be positive.39 In Appendix D,
38The variation across ownership types is straightforward to explain: the regulations are clearly not applied
in the same way to privately owned establishments and government enterprises.
39As described in Section 2, India’s labor regulations are often characterized as being complex, unclear,
outdated and arbitrary, so that it is diﬃcult for ﬁrms to comply with all of their stipulations. It is thus
likely that the Indian setting provides a fertile ground for extortionary corruption.
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we provide evidence that the costs we estimate may also have signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects in
the longer run, as they are associated with lower future growth of employment in registered
manufacturing - and higher future growth of employment in unregistered manufacturing.
This evidence suggests that high eﬀective regulatory costs may play a role in the recent
trend towards informalization in the Indian economy. Before proceeding, we note that the
results of the analyses we run in this section are necessarily somewhat speculative, since we do
not claim to have isolated as-good-as-random variation in states’ corruption environments
and do not believe such variation exists. Therefore, the results in this section should be
treated as suggestive, oﬀering areas for future research to probe.
6.1 ⌧ and Measures of Regulation
We start by regressing our state-level estimates of ⌧ against other established measures of the
regulatory environment (see Table 3).40 These include the “Besley Burgess” (BB) measure of
labor regulations from Aghion et al. (2008) as well as several measures of regulatory reform
from Dougherty (2009). The former is a measure of the number of amendments that a
state government has made to the IDA in either a “pro-worker” or “pro-employer” direction,
as interpreted by Aghion et al. (2008), who update the measure to include amendments
up to 1997.41 Positive values indicate more “pro-worker” amendments, which are assumed
to imply a more restrictive environment for ﬁrms operating in those states. Dougherty
(2009) provides state level reform indicators that reﬂect “the extent to which procedural
or administrative changes have reduced transaction costs in relation to labor issues” by
“limiting the scope of regulations, providing greater clarity in their application, or simplifying
compliance procedures”.42 Higher values therefore indicate an improved environment for
40Note that the estimates of τ we use in all the analysis below were generated using the procedure in
Section 4.3.
41Since there were no state-level amendments to the IDA between 1997 and 2005, this measure is appro-
priate for use with 2005 data.
42These measures are the result of surveying “a labour expert designated by the AIOE [All-India Associa-
tion of Employers] or Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) aﬃliate in the state
capital” of each state, and adjusting the answers “through discussions with local union leaders, independent
28
ﬁrms. Dougherty’s measures are unique in that they cover a wide range of labor-related
issues - not just the IDA.43 In the analysis below, we will focus on an overall measure
of reforms from Dougherty (2009) as well as a measure of reforms regarding the role of
inspectors.44
Going forward, all relevant variables in our analysis have been rescaled to have mean zero
and standard deviation one, with the goal of allowing comparability between regression coef-
ﬁcients in diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Furthermore, we restrict most of our subsequent analysis
to include only the 18 largest states by Net State Domestic Product (NSDP), for which data
are most consistently available, because it leads to the most stable samples across speciﬁca-
tions and because our estimates of ⌧ are most precisely measured for the biggest states.45
Note also that in this and all further regressions in which ⌧ is the regressand, we weight
observations using analytic weights inversely proportional to the variance of our estimate of
⌧ .46
In Table 3, correlations are reported between ⌧ and the other regulatory measures both by
themselves and while controlling for other factors (NSDP per capita and the state’s share of
privately owned establishments). The correlation between ⌧ and the overall index of reforms
from Dougherty (2009) is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and has the correct sign: states that
saw more “transaction cost reducing” reforms have lower ⌧s. Yet stronger is the association
between ⌧ and the subcomponent from Dougherty (2009) measuring reforms related to the
role of inspectors, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level and is large in magnitude: a one
labour experts, employers and state labour commissioners” (Dougherty (2009)).
43Other than the IDA, the speciﬁc areas covered in Dougherty’s index include the “Factories Act, State
Shops and Commercial Establishments Acts, Contract Labour Act, the role of inspectors, the maintenance
of registers, the ﬁling of returns and union representation” (Dougherty (2009)).
44The latter of which captures the extent to which states have reformed rules to constrain the inﬂuence of
inspectors and includes such actions as limiting the number of inspector visits to one per year and requiring
authorization for speciﬁc complaints.
45Our results are robust to this choice.
46In general, using a dependent variable that is generated with error leads to standard errors that are biased
upward. Weighted least squares is a standard approach for improving precision by weighting more heavily
those observations that are estimated more precisely (see Allcott (2015) for another example). Nevertheless,
our conclusion does not depend on this procedure as we obtain qualitatively similar results when using
unweighted regressions.
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standard deviation increase in the degree of inspector-related reforms is associated with a
.65 standard deviation decrease in ⌧ .47
It is reassuring to see that our measure of ⌧ is negatively correlated with Dougherty’s
measures of transaction-cost reducing reforms. We should expect this, since Dougherty’s
measures includes reforms that change how ﬁrms are impacted by laws across the 10 worker
threshold.48 By contrast, the expected correlation between ⌧ and the BB measure is more
ambiguous. On the one hand one might expect no correlation between ⌧ and the BB measure,
as the latter captures variation only due to state amendments to the IDA, which does not
vary over the ten person threshold. On the other hand, many studies use the BB measure
to capture the general regulatory environment (e.g. Adhvaryu et al. (2013)) so we might
well expect it to correlate with our measure of regulatory costs. As it turns out, and with
the considerable caveat that our power is limited by the very small number of observations
available, we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant and relatively small coeﬃcient on the BB measure.
In addition to the above measures regarding state-level changes to the statutory, proce-
dural and administrative aspects of the regulations, we also regress ⌧ against certain other
measures of the labor environment. Table 9 in the Appendix reports the results of ⌧ re-
gressed against per capita measures of strikes, man-days lost to strikes, lockouts, man-days
lost to lockouts and the percentage of registered factories that have been inspected. One
might imagine that strikes and lockouts capture relevant features of the regulatory and labor
environment,49 but we do not ﬁnd them to be robustly correlated with ⌧ . We do ﬁnd, echo-
ing the results of Table 3, a robust correlation between ⌧ and the percentage of registered
factories inspected.
To brieﬂy summarize the analysis so far, the strongest results point to a link between
47τ is not signiﬁcantly correlated with most of the 7 other subcomponent measures from Dougherty (2009).
One notable exception is reforms related to the use of contract workers (not depicted here).
48For example, reforms that aﬀect the powers of inspectors certainly have a diﬀerential impact on ﬁrms
above and below the threshold since ﬁrms above the threshold fall under the legal ambit of many more
inspectors than ﬁrms below the threshold. See Section 6.3 for a complete theoretical discussion.
49For example, some industrial regulations explicitly undermine or support the rights of parties to engage
in strikes or lockouts.
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⌧ and the inspection regime. In particular, imposing reforms that constrain the powers of
inspectors is correlated with lower eﬀective regulatory costs for ﬁrms. This could be because
constraining inspectors allows ﬁrms to avoid the de jure costs associated with following the
rules, or it could be because constraining inspectors makes it harder for them to extort ﬁrms
for bribes. If the latter, we should expect a strong link between ⌧ and the corruption level
of the environment. We look into this next.
6.2 ⌧ and Corruption
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 4 report the results of regressing ⌧ against state level
corruption as measured in a 2005 Transparency International (TI) Survey.50 Column 1
displays the bivariate relationship, Column 2 adds some basic controls (NSDP per capita, and
the share of privately owned establishments), and Column 3 adds the measure of inspector-
related regulatory reform from Dougherty (2009). With no exceptions, the coeﬃcient on the
TI corruption score is consistently signiﬁcant and very large in magnitude: a one standard
deviation increase in a state’s corruption score is associated with a .6-.8 standard deviation
increase in ⌧ . Figure 5 in Appendix E, which depicts the partial residual plot associated
with column 3 of Table 4, conﬁrms that the relationship is not driven by outliers.
One might be concerned, however, that the TI measure may be ﬂawed as it is partly the
result of individuals’ perceptions. To check for robustness of the relationship between ⌧ and
corruption, we regress ⌧ against an alternative measure of corruption that is not perception-
based. Columns 4-6 of Table 4 report the results of ⌧ regressed against the (normalized)
percent of a state’s available electricity that was lost in transmission and distribution in
2005. This variable has been used by other researchers as a proxy for corruption and poor
state governance, and has the virtue of being a concrete and objective measure that does
not depend on perceptions (Kochhar et al. (2006)). As with the TI Corruption Score, the
correlations between ⌧ and this alternative measure of corruption are signiﬁcant and large in
50The TI corruption measure is based on a survey of the perceptions and experiences regarding corruption
in the public sector among 14,405 respondents (Indian households) in 20 Indian states.
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magnitude regardless of sample or controls. To make sure that the results are not driven by
the actual transmission of electricity, we control for per capita electricity available in Column
5 - which does not aﬀect the results. Again, we include a partial residual plot associated
with Column 6 of Table 4 to demonstrate that the results are not driven by outliers (Figure
6 in Appendix E).
Although the state-level correlations between ⌧ and corruption are robust, the regressions
are subject to the concern that our measures of corruption may be correlated with omitted
variables that also inﬂuence ⌧ . To partially address this concern, we provide analysis in
Appendix E that corroborates our results using a conceptually diﬀerent source of variation by
taking advantage of within-state, industry level heterogeneity in the exposure to corruption.
In particular, we hypothesize that if regulations are especially costly due to corruption in
their enforcement, then we would expect costs to be highest for those businesses that are
engaged in regulation-heavy industries when they are located in states with high corruption.
Using data from the World Bank’s 2005 Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Survey of India
(FACS) to create an industry level measure of “regulatory intensity,” we test this hypothesis
in Table 10 of Appendix E and ﬁnd that the interaction between industry level “regulatory
intensity” and state level corruption is indeed associated with higher eﬀective regulatory
costs (⌧).51 In this analysis, bias can only arise if omitted variables exist that are correlated
with the interaction between state level corruption and industry level “regulatory intensity,”
which is harder to argue.
The main goal of this and the preceding tests is to demonstrate that the link between
regulatory costs and corruption is stable and robust to very diﬀerent ways of conceptualizing
exposure to corruption. Next, we turn our attention to the question of how and why greater
corruption would lead to higher labor costs for ﬁrms. To this end, we outline a simple
theoretical framework to elucidate the potential connection in the following subsection.
51The analysis and data construction are described more fully in Appendix E.
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6.3 A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Corruption Be-
tween Inspectors and Firms
We distinguish between two types of corruption that could take place between inspectors
and ﬁrms: collusion and extortion. Collusion takes place when corrupt inspectors allow ﬁrms
to avoid the costs of complying with regulations in exchange for bribes. However, poor state
governance (which here would imply an inability to control corruption) would then lead to
lower costs for ﬁrms, as greater corruption would make it easier to avoid the full costs of
regulation.52 However, what we observed in Section 6.1 was a robust positive correlation
between eﬀective costs (⌧) and poor governance/corruption. To explain this phenomenon,
we sketch a simple model which nests both collusionary and extortionary behavior in order
to illustrate how corruption might lead to higher per worker costs for ﬁrms that exceed the
10 worker threshold.
Before we go through the formalism of the model, it is worth pausing to ﬂesh out the
nature of the extortionary practices that ﬁrms may be exposed to when crossing the 10
worker regulatory threshold. Suppose that the regulations which apply to ﬁrms with more
than 10 workers are so complex as to make it impossible (or prohibitively costly) for any
ﬁrm to be fully in compliance with all aspects of the law as written. This does not require
much imagination. As mentioned in Section 2, many of the laws have components that
are antiquated, arbitrary, contradictory and confusing. That the laws may be impossible
to fully comply with is suggested by some of the anecdotes we provide in Appendix A and
the descriptions of the excessive speciﬁcity of the regulations we provided in Section 2.
Then, a dishonest inspector can, at any time, choose to subject a ﬁrm under his jurisdiction
to a penalty, which may include ﬁnancial (e.g. ﬁnes) and/or non-ﬁnancial elements (e.g.
harassment, time needed to defend claims of violations, prison terms). One could think of
the extent of the penalty as a function of state governance: properly functioning governments
hire and motivate inspectors to pursue substantive violations rather than minor ones, while
52See, for example, a model of corruption such as the one in Khan et al. (2015).
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inspectors in corrupt or dysfunctional governments can get away with threatening to impose
high penalties for even minor technical violations if a bribe is not paid (i.e. extortion).
Next we describe the set-up of the model, the timeline of which is described below and in
Figure 4. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms must choose their number of workers (n ≥ 10 or n0 < 10).53
As in Section 4.1, ﬁrms are characterized by a productivity parameter ↵, so that ﬁrms with
higher productivity would like to choose higher n. If ﬁrms choose n greater than or equal
to 10, they come under the legal purview of certain size-based regulations, which makes it
more diﬃcult for them to appeal extortionary practices on the part of inspectors.
After choosing a level of employment, ﬁrms are randomly matched with an inspector.
With probability κ, the inspector is corrupt; otherwise the inspector is honest. An honest
inspector will enforce a reasonable interpretation of the spirit of the regulations if the ﬁrm
has more than 10 workers. To be compliant with this “reasonable” interpretation of the
regulations will cost the ﬁrm an amount F1(n), which may in general depend on the number
of workers in the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm with fewer than 10 workers incurs no regulatory costs if
matched with an honest inspector.
If the ﬁrm is instead matched with a corrupt inspector, the inspector will threaten to
report the ﬁrm for technical infractions as described above - unless it pays a bribe (which
we denote b or b0, depending on whether the ﬁrm has chosen n ≥ 10 or n0 < 10), the
value of which is determined by Nash Bargaining. The ﬁrm may choose to pay the bribe or
appeal the threatened ﬁne in court. If appealing the ﬁne in court, the ﬁrm will win with
probability p (or p0) but will incur legal fees (cL) with certainty. If it wins the case, the ﬁrm
has no further ﬁnancial obligations. If the ﬁrm loses, it is obliged to pay an amount F2(n).
Let us assume that F2(n) is much larger than F1(n), which is tantamount to supposing
that a reasonable level of compliance with regulations is not costly in comparison to the
punishments that could be brought by an inspector for violating the regulations. This may
be a reasonable assumption in contexts where inspectors have a great amount of bargaining
53Throughout, primes will denote the values of variables on the side of the decision tree in which ﬁrms
hire less than 10 workers.
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power and discretion in assigning punishments. This assumption is what makes the behavior
extortionary rather than collusive: if F1(n) were large in comparison with F2(n), ﬁrms would
face lower costs with corrupt inspectors than with honest ones and would be better oﬀ
colluding. It is also plausible that both F2(n) and F1(n) are increasing functions of the
number of workers, especially if we acknowledge that the full cost of any ﬁne would include
the opportunity cost of a manager’s time. We will consider the case where the total ﬁnes are
directly proportional to the number of workers: Fi(n) = fi⇤n. The decision tree representing
the ﬁrm’s choices described above is provided in Figure 4.
An important assumption is that p0, the probability of a ﬁrm’s winning the case when
n0 < 10, is much higher than p, the probability of winning the case when n ≥ 10. The idea
is that a ﬁrm with less than 10 workers is not under the legal purview of the regulations, so
any case regarding regulatory infractions brought against the ﬁrm would have no standing in
court. In what follows, we will take p = 0 and p0 = 1 for simplicity. As previously mentioned,
if the ﬁrm meets a corrupt inspector, the value of the bribe paid to avoid going to court is
determined through a process of Nash Bargaining over the surplus, where ↵ and β are the
bargaining weights of the inspector and ﬁrm, respectively:
max
b
(b)α(cL + (1− p)F2(n)− b)
β
The solution of this maximization problem is that b = α(cL+(1−p)F2(n))
α+β




for ﬁrms with less than 10 workers). Given that ﬁrms meet corrupt inspectors (and thus pay
bribes) with probability κ and meet honest inspectors (and thus pay F1(n)) with probability
1− κ, the expected cost for a ﬁrm with greater than 10 workers is κb+ (1− κ)F1(n), while
the expected cost for a ﬁrm with less than 10 workers is κb0. Taking the diﬀerence and sub-
stituting in our expressions for b and b0, we get that ﬁrms that cross the 10 worker threshold
face an increase in expected costs of κ α
α+β
(p0 − p)F2(n) + (1− κ)F1(n).
We are interested, however, in the increase in per worker costs that ﬁrms face when
exceeding the 10 worker threshold, not the increase in total costs (as discussed earlier, an
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increase in per worker costs is the only way to produce a downshift in the logged ﬁrm size
distribution in a static model). Thus, we divide the last result by the number of workers,
n, to get per worker costs. Before doing so, we make the further simpliﬁcations that p = 0,
p0 = 1, ↵ and β both equal 1 (equal bargaining weights), and that all ﬁnes are proportional
to ﬁrm size (Fi(n) = fi ⇤n). Then, the increase in per worker costs for ﬁrms that exceed the
10 worker threshold (i.e. what we call ⌧ in the paper) is κf2
2
+ (1− κ)f1.
From the last result we see that if f2 ≫ f1 (in particular, in this case, if f2 > 2f1),
then the increase in a ﬁrm’s per worker costs for exceeding the 10 worker threshold (i.e.
τ) is increasing in the proportion of corrupt inspectors, κ. Again, that we are considering
a context of extortion or “harassment bribery” is implied by the assumption f2 ≫ f1. It
is this condition (that f2 is very large) that gives corrupt inspectors the power to extract
heavy bribes. We think it is a reasonable assumption given anecdotal evidence regarding
bribery in India (some of which we present in Appendix A). To conclude this subsection, the
model above illustrates conditions that may explain the correlations we observed between
corruption and τ in Section 6. In particular, the conclusion of the model is that ﬁrms in
states with a higher proportion of corrupt inspectors (i.e. more corrupt states) will face
higher per worker costs for exceeding the 10 worker threshold (higher τ) if inspectors have
bargaining power and discretion in assigning heavy punishments for technical infractions.
7 Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on labor regulations in developing
countries. We provide estimates of the unit labor costs associated with a suite of regula-
tions whose components have hitherto received little attention in the literature on developing
countries. These regulations include mandatory beneﬁts, workplace safety provisions, and
reporting requirements where the literature has previously emphasized employment protec-
tion legislation and minimum wage laws. In the Indian context, we ﬁnd that the costs
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associated with the combination of mandatory beneﬁts, workplace safety provisions, and re-
porting requirements are much larger than those associated with the most stringent portion
of the country’s employment protection legislation. Our results suggest that these types of
regulations deserve more attention than they have received to this point.
Our results also suggest a mechanism that may explain why these regulations are so
costly in a developing country context: high de facto regulatory costs appear to be driven
by extortionary corruption on the part of inspectors. Speciﬁcally, we show that Indian
states that have reformed their inspector-related regulations in a positive way face lower
regulatory costs and states with the highest levels of corruption also have the higest levels
of regulatory costs. Furthermore, ﬁrms in industries with high “regulatory intensity” are
exposed to particularly high costs if they are also located in highly corrupt states. This
analysis points to the size of regulatory costs’ having more to do with the way regulations
are implemented than with the content of the speciﬁc laws themselves.
In addition to the above, our paper also makes a methodological contribution. We extend
GLV’s theoretical model to allow ﬁrms to strategically misreport their sizes and simultane-
ously develop an empirical strategy to estimate costs from a ﬁrm size distribution under
the assumptions of our model. We show that ignoring the problem of misreporting can
lead to vastly over-estimating the actual costs of the regulations. We believe this contribu-
tion will ﬁnd applications in other developing country settings, where the costs of strategic
misreporting are typically low.
We close by noting that our analysis reveals the net costs of regulations borne by ﬁrms,
but does not speak directly to the possible beneﬁts to workers. Our results do suggest that
the current regulations make it easy for inspectors to penalize ﬁrms for technical violations
rather than violations of grave consequence.54 To the extent that this is so, it is unlikely
that workers derive as much protective beneﬁt from the regulations as they might otherwise.
It is diﬃcult to arrive at more concrete conclusions, as data do not exist that would allow
54We think of this distinction as being related to the diﬀerence between enforcing the letter versus the
spirit of the law.
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one to measure how workers would beneﬁt if their employers were made to follow the spirit
rather than the letter of the law. However, the results hint at an intriguing possibility: by
simplifying regulations identiﬁed as costly (or by clarifying compliance and enforcement), it
may be possible to reduce the costs borne by ﬁrms without diminishing eﬀective protection
for workers.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: 2005 Distribution of Establishment Size
Note: total number of workers is the number of workers usually working daily in an establishment. The graph is cut oﬀ
at 200 total workers because the fraction of establishments of sizes greater than 200 is too small to appear in the ﬁgure.
Source: 2005 Economic Census of India. Source: 2005 Economic Census of India.
Figure 2: 2005 Log-Log Distribution of Establishment Size
Note: Both axes are on a log scale. Total number of workers is the number of workers usually working daily in an establish-
ment. Source: 2005 Economic Census of India.
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Figure 3: Model Fit and Data
Note: This ﬁgure shows the ﬁt of the model described in Section 4.3 (the black line) to the data (dark grey points). Model
estimation involves non-parametric smoothing using the method described in Markovitch and Krieger (2000) with a band-
width of 0.005 as a ﬁrst step. The smoothed density estimates are shown in light grey. The second step is to ﬁt the black
line to the light grey points. Both axes in log scale. Source: 2005 Economic Census of India.





































pi(α, n)− cL − F2(n)
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Uttar Pradesh 0.502 (0.254)
By Industry
Wholesale & retail trade 0.637 (0.094)
Manufacturing 0.268 (0.085)
Construction 0.478 (0.549)
Electricity, gas and water -0.367 (0.145)
By Ownership Type
Government and PSU -0.092 (0.128)
Unincorporated Proprietary 0.430 (0.059)
Note: This table presents estimates of regulatory costs faced by establishments that hire 10 or more workers, using the
methodology described in Section 4 with a bandwidth of 0.005. Standard errors generated using a clustered bootstrap
procedure with 200 replications are presented in parentheses. Clustering is done at the 4 digit (NIC code) industry level,
following Garicano et al. (2016). Estimates are presented for a subset of states, industries and ownership types, as well
as at the All-India level. Results for all states, industries and ownership types are available in Appendix C. Source: 2005
Economic Census of India.
Table 2: Estimate of ⌧ at 100 worker threshold
All-India ⌧ s.e.
0.044 (0.039)
Note: This table presents an estimate of regulatory costs faced by establishments that hire 100 or more workers, using the
methodology described in Section 4. The standard error generated using a clustered bootstrap procedure with 200 repli-
cations is presented in parentheses. Clustering is done at the 4 digit (NIC code) industry level, following Garicano et al.
(2016). The estimate is presented for the All-India level. Source: 2005 Economic Census of India.
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Table 3: Tau vs Other Measures of Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tau tau tau tau tau tau
Dougherty measure -0.424⇤ -0.431⇤
(all reforms) (0.212) (0.235)
Dougherty measure -0.549⇤⇤⇤ -0.652⇤⇤⇤
(inspector reforms) (0.170) (0.150)
Besley-Burgess 0.223 0.237
measure (regs) (0.182) (0.183)
log of net state -0.463⇤ -0.527⇤⇤ -0.518⇤⇤
domestic product pc (0.262) (0.204) (0.235)
share of privately -0.0632 8.524 -12.80
owned establishments (7.095) (6.707) (8.354)
Constant 0.203 4.945 0.288⇤ -1.923 0.00679 16.67⇤
(0.222) (6.800) (0.149) (6.529) (0.292) (7.798)
Observations 18 18 18 18 15 15
Note: This table tests for correlations between our estimated regulatory costs (tau) and other established measures of the
regulatory environment from the previous literature. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations
are weighted by the inverse variance of tau and include only the 18 largest Indian States, as measured by NSDP. Sources:
Dougherty(2009); Besley and Burgess(2004); RBI.
Table 4: Tau vs State Level Measures of Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tau tau tau tau tau tau
TI Corruption Score 0.812⇤⇤ 0.806⇤⇤ 0.685⇤⇤⇤
(0.290) (0.342) (0.129)
electricity losses 0.925⇤⇤⇤ 0.948⇤⇤ 0.575⇤⇤⇤
(0.310) (0.326) (0.190)
log of net state -0.0667 -0.213 -0.219 -0.350⇤⇤
domestic product pc (0.338) (0.285) (0.131) (0.133)
share of privately -2.323 6.335⇤ 1.365 7.900
owned establishments (4.493) (3.376) (4.940) (5.153)
Dougherty measure -0.594⇤⇤⇤ -0.500⇤⇤⇤
(inspection reforms) (0.0932) (0.116)
Electricity 0.109
available (GWH) (0.134)
Constant 0.334 3.075 -2.935 0.476⇤⇤ 1.365 -2.956
(0.213) (4.682) (3.836) (0.169) (4.634) (4.728)
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18
Measure of Corruption TI TI TI TDLs TDLs TDLs
Note: This table reports the results of our estimated regulatory costs (tau) regressed against two diﬀerent measures of cor-
ruption. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the inverse variance of tau
and include only the 18 largest Indian States, as measured by NSDP. Sources: Transparency International (2005); RBI;
Dougherty(2009).
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Appendices for Online Publication
Only
A Qualitative Evidence Regarding Harassment Bribery
from “ipaidabribe.com”
“I am a small factory owner in Kirti Nagar Industrial Area. We follow almost all rules laid
down by government for the welfare of workers. Now, even if we follow everything there is
always somethings where we lack and which needs improvement. We have a factory inspector
by the name of Mr. ———– (M: ———-). He comes to all the factories in our area, inspects
them, ﬁnd mistakes and then harass and blackmails us. According to him he can get our
factories sealed. To avoid this, to save our time and to save the unnecessary paperwork
we pay him every year. I have paid him twice in two years i.e. 10000 & 15000 and this is
common with all factories. Please take a strict action against him so that he learns a lesson.
I am sure he is not alone. All his colleagues are equally corrupt.”
(Reported on August 11, 2014 from New Delhi, Delhi — Report #131791)
“During the routine labor veriﬁcation process by the labor department at our oﬃce, we
were advised by the consultant to pay the labor inspector a bribe to ensure that they don’t
keep calling us for needless paperwork.”
(Reported on June 28, 2011 from Chennai, Tamil Nadu — Report #35064)
“The Labour Department requires a dozen odd registers to be maintained some of them
which are totally outdated and pointless. E.g: Salary register, Attendance register, Leave
register etc.
Our IT oﬃce has an electronic system that logs all entries/exits and leave taken. We
have the records and oﬀerred to provide it to them in a printout.
Salaries are paid electronically via bank transfer.
The oﬃcer declined and said it must be maintained in a manual register!
Finally an arrangement was made where we maintain a few records manually and the
rest he would overlook.
Cost of arrangement Rs 1500 twice a year even if the oﬃcer shows up only once a year
for the inspection!
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He is supposed to inspect twice so expects to be paid even for the time he did not show
up!” (Reported on October 13, 2010 from Chennai, Tamil Nadu — Report #44950)
“Well i had gone to renew my labour license and after all the running around in the bank
and the department, the signing authority asked me to pay Rs.500 for signing. When asked
why 500, i was told since there are 5 employees for Rs.100 each.” (Reported on December
31, 2010 from Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh — Report #43509 )
“... in my third visit i met one of oﬃce peon in Labour oﬃce he guided me for the bribe
he also investigated and advised me for bribe according to the number of Employees deployed
on contract basis and for this valueble suggestion he charged me Rs. 100. Again with full
conﬁdence i went to the ALCs desk and straight away i oﬀered him the packet which was
contains the amount of Bribe Rs. 3000/- ... He issued me the license after oﬃce hours...”
(Reported on March 30, 2011 from Mumbai, Maharashtra — Report #39133)
“Applying for shop & establishment [registration] & procured all documents relating to
the registration. Finally inspectors are asking Rs.1000 as a bribe. If any other notice received
by the company for resolving that another Rs.2000 and above , it depends on the company”
(Reported on March 28, 2014 from Bangalore, Karnataka — Report #99016)
“Oﬃcer name ————- . Mobile no. ———– He is asking for a bribe of 60,000 and is
saying will issue a negative report under labour laws.” (Reported on January 24, 2014 from
Gurgaon, Haryana — Report #83365)
B Omitted Proofs Regarding the Theoretical Log Den-
sity of Firm Size With and Without Misreporting
B.1 Derivation of the theoretical log density without misreporting
In this part of the appendix, we include the steps omitted in section 4.1 when deriving the
theoretical log density of ﬁrm size.55 As noted earlier, the primitive of the model is the
distribution of managerial ability (↵), which we assume follows a power law: φ(↵) = cα↵
−βα ,
where cα ⌘ (βα − 1)↵
βα−1 and ↵ is the minimum possible value of ↵56.
55The analysis here follows closely from that of GLV (see their Appendix B for their derivation).










where again, n is the number of workers a ﬁrm employs, w is a constant wage paid to
all workers, and ⌧¯ is a proportional tax on labor that takes the value 1 if n  N and 1 + ⌧
if n > N , where ⌧ > 0. The resulting ﬁrst order condition suggests the following general






1−θ . However, this
relationship is discontinuous at N and only applies for interior solutions: some ﬁrms will
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to choose the corner solution of n(↵) = N rather than n⇤(↵).
In fact, ﬁrms can be sorted into three categories, according to their productivity, ↵.
1) Firms with the lowest values of ↵(2 [↵, ↵1]) are not aﬀected by the regulation and







1−θ  N . ↵1 is deﬁned such that ⇡(n









2) Firms with productivity larger than ↵1 but lower than another threshold (↵2 (↵1, ↵2]),
ﬁnd it optimal to choose n⇤(↵) = N , rather than exceed the threshold and expose themselves
to the discontinuously higher costs associated with the size-based regulation.
3) The last category includes those ﬁrms with the highest productivities (↵ > ↵2). These
ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to exceed the threshold even though it means paying higher unit labor






1−θ . ↵2 is deﬁned such that ⇡(n



















1−θ  N if ↵ 2 [↵, ↵1]







1−θ > N if ↵ > ↵2
An exact expression for the distribution of ﬁrm size, χ(n), can now be recovered as a
transformation of the distribution of managerial ability, φ(↵), since the ﬁrst-order conditions
on the ﬁrms’ maximization problems imply the monotonic relationship between ↵ and n
described above. Speciﬁcally, we transform φ(↵) into χ(n) using the change of variables












(N1−β − (1 + ⌧)−
β−1
1−θ n1−βu ) if n = N




(β − 1)(1 + ⌧)−
β−1
1−θ n−β if n ≥ nu
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B.2 Full Derivation of the Theoretical Log Density With Misre-
porting
In this part of the appendix, we include the steps omitted in section 4.2 when deriving the
theoretical log density of true and reported ﬁrm size in the presence of misreporting. We
begin by restating the proﬁt-maximization problem (in Equation 6) for a ﬁrm that is now
allowed to choose both its true employment (n) and its reported employment (l):
⇡(↵) = max
n,l
↵f(n)− wn− ⌧wl ⇤ {l > 9} − F (n, l) ⇤ p(n, l)
where ↵, f(n), w and ⌧ are all deﬁned as they were previously. As noted, the problem is
similar to the case without misreporting except that now ﬁrms pay the extra marginal cost,
⌧w, only on their reported employment, and not on their true employment. Furthermore,
they only pay this cost if their reported employment exceeds the regulatory threshold, N = 9.
The other new elements are p(n, l), which is the probability that a misreporting ﬁrm is caught
by the authorities and F (n, l), which is the ﬁne that a ﬁrm caught misreporting must pay.
Therefore, ﬁrms must trade oﬀ the beneﬁt of lower regulatory costs from under-reporting
their employment against the expected cost of being caught and ﬁned for under-reporting
(F ⇤ p).
For now we assume a particular functional form for the misreporting costs, F (n, l) = F






, but we show in the next subsection of this Appendix that
our main result obtains for any convex form of misreporting costs. We also reintroduce our
earlier assumption that ﬁrms’ production functions are power (f(n) = nθ), so that the proﬁt
maximization problem for a ﬁrm with productivity ↵ is:
⇡(↵) = max
n,l




As before, the solution to this problem looks diﬀerent depending on which of three diﬀerent
productivity categories the ﬁrm falls into:
1) Firms with the lowest values of ↵(2 [↵, ↵1]) are not aﬀected by the regulation and







1−θ  N . Because their true employment is below the regulatory threshold, they
have no incentive to misreport and hence choose l⇤1(↵) = n
⇤
1(↵). ↵1 is deﬁned such that










2) Firms with productivity larger than ↵1 but lower than another threshold (↵2 (↵1, ↵2]),
will choose n > N , exceeding the regulatory threshold, but will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to misreport
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their employment, setting l⇤2(↵) = N .
57 These ﬁrms will only appear to be “bunched” up at
9, but will in fact have higher employment. The employment function, n⇤2(↵), for these ﬁrms
is deﬁned implicitly from the ﬁrst order condition: ↵✓n⇤2(↵)
θ−1 − w − F
50
[n⇤2(↵)−N ] = 0.
3) The last category includes those ﬁrms with the highest productivities (↵ > ↵2). These
ﬁrms are productive enough to warrant hiring work forces so large that they cannot choose
l = 9 while simultaneously avoiding detection with reasonable probability and must report
l > 9. Even these ﬁrms, however, with both n > 9 and l > 9 do not ﬁnd it proﬁt-





w⌧ . In other words, these ﬁrms can save on their unit labor costs by shading down their
reported employment. Importantly, the degree of misreporting is by a constant amount that
is independent of ﬁrm size (50
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To summarize then, full mappings between productivity ↵ and the true ﬁrm size n, as










1−θ  N if ↵ 2 [↵, ↵1]



















1−θ  N if ↵ 2 [↵, ↵1]











w⌧ > N if ↵ > ↵2
From these functions we can obtain expressions for the distributions of true and reported
ﬁrm size, χ(n) and  (l), as transformations of the distribution of managerial ability, φ(↵)
(where φ(↵) = cα↵









1−θ n−β if n 2 [nmin, N)∣∣∣dα⇤2(n)dn ∣∣∣φ(↵⇤2(n)) if n 2 [N, n⇤2(↵2))








1−θ (1 + ⌧)−
β−1
1−θ n−β if n ≥ n⇤3(↵2)
57Conditional on misreporting a positive amount, setting l = N is the “optimal lie” for these ﬁrms since
it yields the largest beneﬁt (by reducing ﬁrms’ regulatory burden to 0) while minimizing the misreporting
costs.










1−θ l−β if l 2 [nmin, N)´ α2
α1
φ(↵)d↵ = δl if l = N






1−θ (1 + ⌧)−
β−1
1−θ [l + 50
F
w⌧ ]−β if l ≥ l⇤3(↵2)
where β = ✓ + βα − ✓βα and ↵
⇤
2(n) is the inverse function of n
⇤
2(↵), implicitly deﬁned
above. Taking the logarithm of each expression delivers the version of the distributions




logA− βlog(n) if n 2 [nmin, 9)
log[⇠(n)] if n 2 [9, nm(↵2)]
− if n 2 (nm(↵2), nt(↵2))
logA− β−1
1−θ




logA− βlog(l) if l 2 [lmin, 9)
log(δl) if l = 9
− if n 2 (9, lt(↵2))
logA− β−1
1−θ
log(1 + ⌧)− βlog(l + 50
F
w⌧) if l ≥ lt(↵2)
where terms have been simpliﬁed with two substitutions.59 These are the densities de-
scribed in the main text.
B.3 Proof that Convex Misreporting Costs Imply Convergence
Between True and Reported Firm Size Distributions
An important implication of the misreporting model from section 4.2 is that the diﬀerence
between the log density of reported ﬁrm size,  (l), and the log density of true ﬁrm size,
χ(n), converges to 0 for large values of n, l. In this section of the appendix we show that this
result does not hinge on a speciﬁc functional form for the misreporting costs, but instead
requires only that the expected costs of misreporting are increasing and strictly convex in
the degree of misreporting.
We replace our former expression for the expected costs of misreporting, F (u) ⇤ p(u),
with the simpler expression M(u), since here we do not need to distinguish between the ﬁne
if caught and the probability of being caught. Given these substitutions, the problem of a
ﬁrm with the option of misreporting can be written:










↵f(n)− wn− ⌧w(n− u) ⇤ {n− u > 9} −M(u)
which is identical to Equation 6 except for the change in variables (u for n − l) and the
more general expression for the expected costs of misreporting. Under Assumption 1, the
ﬁrst order condition on u for a large ﬁrm (i.e. one whose reported employment exceeds the
threshold) is: ⌧w −M 0(u) = 0. The ﬁrst term denotes the beneﬁt of increasing u by one
unit (in terms of regulatory costs avoided) while the second term captures the marginal cost
of u. The ﬁrst term is constant, while the second starts from 0 (for u = 0) and increases at
an increasing rate. There exists therefore some value of misreporting that satisﬁes the ﬁrst
order condition, given by u⇤ =M 0−1(⌧w). Note that the optimal value for misreporting, u⇤,
does not depend on ↵. This means that, for the largest set of ﬁrms, misreporting is by the
same constant amount, regardless of ﬁrm size or productivity: l(↵) = n(↵)− u⇤.
To see that this result is all that is required for the diﬀerence between the reported
distribution and the true distribution to converge to 0, consider the analysis in the pre-
vious sub-appendix, but with the more general result that u⇤ = M 0−1(⌧w). Then, it is
straightforward to show that logχ(n) = logA − β−1
1−θ
log(1 + ⌧) − βlog(n) and log (l) =
logA − β−1
1−θ
log(1 + ⌧) − βlog(l + u⇤) for ﬁrms above the threshold. For large values (i.e.
l = n = x!1), the diﬀerence between these two density functions goes to 0:
lim
x!1







B.4 Misreporting by Enumerators
In the text we referred to a second potential source of misreporting: not only might ﬁrms
lie to enumerators about their size, enumerators themselves might lie when recording the
ﬁgures reported to them by ﬁrms. One reason this might happen is that Economic Census
enumerators were required to ﬁll out an extra form containing the address of any establish-
ment that reported 10 or more workers. It is therefore conceivable that enumerators might
have found it preferable to under-report the number of workers for establishments with 10
or more workers in order to avoid the extra burden of ﬁlling in the “Address Slip”. To show
that this other source of potential misreporting is unlikely to bias our results, we consider
a very simple model of enumerator misreporting. The model demonstrates that, since the
cost of ﬁlling in the address slip is a ﬁxed cost, it is not likely to lead to a “downshift” in
the distribution, which means it is therefore unlikely to bias our estimate of ⌧ .
The model begins with ﬁrms facing the same problem speciﬁed in Equation 1, with the
same resulting distribution of the true ﬁrm size, χ(n). Then, all ﬁrms are matched with
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an enumerator, who must decide how to report the size of the ﬁrm they meet. In general,
the reported size, l, may or may not be equal to the true ﬁrm size, n. If an enumerator
reports a size l > 9, they must face the burden of ﬁlling out an address slip, at cost C > 0.
If they report l  9, they pay no such cost. Importantly, the cost C is constant and does
not depend on the size of the ﬁrm.60 Furthermore, enumerators face expected costs of
misreporting, M(u), where u ⌘ n− l.61 M(u) captures both the probability of being caught
as well as the penalty faced if caught. The only assumptions we make on M(u) are that it is
strictly increasing in u and that M(0) = 0.62 Then the utility maximization problem faced
by an enumerator matched with a ﬁrm of size n is:
U(n) = max
u
−C {n− u > 9} −M(u)
For enumerators matched with ﬁrms of size n < 9, the optimal decision is to choose
l = n, or u = 0, because there is no need to misreport. Then, their utility is maximized at
0. Enumerators matched with ﬁrms larger than 9 must decide whether to report the size
truthfully and bear the address slip cost or lie in order to avoid the cost of ﬁlling out the
address slip. Since M(u) is increasing in u, misreporting costs will be lower than C for low
values of u and higher than C for high enough values.63 Therefore, enumerators matched
with ﬁrms of an intermediate size (i.e. n 2 [9, n¯]) will ﬁnd it optimal to lie by choosing l = 9
or u = n − 9, in order to avoid the ﬁxed cost of ﬁlling out the address slip. n¯ is deﬁned
such that C = M(n¯ − 9), so that an enumerator matched with a ﬁrm of size n¯ would be
indiﬀerent between misreporting (l = 9) and reporting truthfully (l = n¯). For enumerators
matched with ﬁrms of size n > n¯, the cost of misreporting exceeds the cost of ﬁlling out the
address slip, so they are better oﬀ bearing the address slip cost and reporting truthfully (i.e.
setting l = n or u = 0).





n if n 2 [nmin, 9)
9 if n 2 [9, n¯]
n if n > n¯
60This reﬂects the fact that it is no more costly (in terms of time or hassle) to ﬁll in an address slip for a
ﬁrm of size 20 than a ﬁrm of size 200.
61As before we will only consider nonnegative values of u, since there will be no incentive to over-report
ﬁrm size.
62The latter assumption is made only for simplicity of exposition.
63The other possibility is that M(u) < C 8 u, but this case is not very interesting and is clearly not borne
out by the data (it would suggest that enumerators should always misreport ﬁrm size to be 9).
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Given this mapping between reported and actual employment, the reported ﬁrm size




χ(n) if l 2 [nmin, 9)´ n¯
9
χ(n)dn = δe if l = 9
0 if l 2 (9, n¯]
χ(n) if l ≥ n¯
In other words, the enumerator misreporting will cause the reported distribution to ex-
hibit “bunching before the threshold as well as a “valley” after the threshold, even if neither
phenomena exists in the true distribution. However, the reported distribution coincides with
the true distribution before the threshold and for values far above the threshold. In other
words, enumerator misreporting does not cause a downshift in the reported distribution in
excess of the downshift in the true distribution and hence does not bias our estimate of ⌧ .
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C Full Results by State, Industry and Ownership Type
for the 10-worker Threshold
Table 5: Estimates of ⌧ by State
State Tau Standard Error
Bihar .693 .302
Karnataka .52 .156
Uttar Pradesh .502 .254
Delhi .427 .213
Tamil Nadu .397 .154
Jharkhand .388 .194










Andhra Pradesh -.159 .053
Himachal Pradesh -.165 .159
Note: This table presents estimates of regulatory costs faced by establishments that hire 10 or more workers, using the
methodology described in Section 4. Standard errors generated using a clustered bootstrap procedure with 200 replica-
tions are presented in parentheses. Clustering is done at the 4 digit (NIC code) industry level, following GLV. Estimates
are presented for the 18 largest states (by NSDP). Source: 2005 Economic Census of India.
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Table 6: Estimates of ⌧ by Industry
Industry Tau Standard Error
Wholesale and retail trade .637 .094
Real estate, renting and business activities .601 .158
Construction .478 .549
Hotels and restaurants .468 .222
Transport, storage and communications .334 .209
Manufacturing .268 .085
Other service activities .264 .186
Health and social work .076 .149
Mining and quarrying -.042 .294
Financial intermediation -.105 .074
Education -.173 .15
Public administration and defence -.311 .034
Electricity, gas and water supply -.367 .145
Note: This table presents estimates of regulatory costs faced by establishments that hire 10 or more workers, using the
methodology described in Section 4. Standard errors generated using a clustered bootstrap procedure with 200 replica-
tions are presented in parentheses. Clustering is done at the 4 digit (NIC code) industry level, following GLV. Estimates
are presented for all major industry categories. Source: 2005 Economic Census of India.
Table 7: Estimates of ⌧ by Ownership Type
Ownership Type Tau Standard Error
Unincorporated proprietary .43 .059
Co-operative -.007 .075
Non proﬁt institution -.04 .095
Unincorporated partnership -.058 .053
Government and public sector undertaking -.092 .128
Corporate ﬁnancial -.18 .055
Corporate non ﬁnancial -.197 .05
Note: This table presents estimates of regulatory costs faced by establishments that hire 10 or more workers, using the
methodology described in Section 4. Standard errors generated using a clustered bootstrap procedure with 200 replica-
tions are presented in parentheses. Clustering is done at the 4 digit (NIC code) industry level, following GLV. Estimates
are presented by ownership type of the establishment. Source: 2005 Economic Census of India.
D Possible Consequences of ⌧
In Section 6 we argued that our estimated costs (⌧) are mostly due, not only to the substance
of the regulations themselves, but also to high levels of corruption. In this subsection we
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will indicate possible consequences of high values of ⌧ . In what follows we use two distinct
measures of ⌧ : one which is created using all the establishments in a state, regardless of
economic sector (⌧) and another which is created using only the establishments engaged in
manufacturing (⌧manuf ).
Table 8 displays the results of employment growth in the manufacturing sector between
2010 and 2005 at the state level regressed against our two measures of labor market distor-
tions (⌧ and ⌧manuf ) as well alternative measures (Dougherty and BB). For each of the four
measures, we observe its performance as a predictor of future employment growth in regis-
tered manufacturing as well as unregistered manufacturing. Interestingly, in the regressions
of employment growth in registered manufacturing against ⌧manuf , the coeﬃcient on ⌧manuf
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while the coeﬃcient for employment growth in
unregistered manufacturing is positive and signiﬁcant. This result makes sense: we should
expect higher costs to negatively aﬀect the sectors to which the costs apply - in this case the
registered sector, since that is under the ambit of labor regulations while the unregistered
sector is not.64 If these correlations reﬂect a causal chain, it would mean that high levels
of regulatory costs and corruption (as measured by ⌧) are pushing employment from the
registered to the unregistered sector.
Also included in Table 8 are the results of employment growth in manufacturing re-
gressed against the BB and Dougherty measures. Neither regressor has a coeﬃcient that is
statistically signiﬁcant or of a meaningful magnitude.65
64It also makes sense that the coeﬃcients on τ are insigniﬁcant, since τ is measured across all sectors and
will be less pertinent to manufacturing performance than τmanuf .
65One might argue that it is not quite fair to regress growth between 2010 and 2005 on a regressor that
uses data from 1997, as is the case for the BB measure. However, we have duplicated these results using
growth from 1997 to 2002 and the results are the same. Furthermore, the Besley Burgess measure from
Aghion et al. (2008) should the same in 2005 due to the lack of state level reforms between 1997 and 2005.
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Table 8: Manufacturing Employment Growth (2005 - 2010) vs Tau and Other Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf
tau -0.0240 0.00197
(0.0176) (0.0233)
tau (manuf) -0.0471⇤⇤ 0.0623⇤⇤
(0.0217) (0.0256)
Besley-Burgess -0.00525 0.00979
measure (regs) (0.00731) (0.0142)
Dougherty measure 0.0226 -0.0143
(all reforms) (0.0130) (0.0159)
log of net state 0.00312 0.0189 0.0107 0.0192 0.00413 0.0140 0.0212 0.0136
domestic product pc (0.0178) (0.0214) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.00863) (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0195)
share of employment -0.393 0.00558 -0.708⇤⇤ 0.435 0.0194 -0.559 -0.515⇤ 0.0525
in manufacturing (0.258) (0.329) (0.258) (0.325) (0.186) (0.362) (0.245) (0.323)
Constant 0.0969 -0.182 0.0372 -0.229 0.0209 -0.0675 -0.0861 -0.131
(0.173) (0.209) (0.139) (0.152) (0.0825) (0.160) (0.147) (0.182)
Observations 18 17 18 17 15 15 18 17
Note: This table reports the results of employment growth in the registered and unregistered manufacturing sectors against
several measures of the regulatory environment, including our own estimated regulatory costs (tau). Robust standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses. Observations are unweighted and include only the 18 largest Indian States, as measured
by NSDP. Sources: Besley and Burgess (2004); Dougherty(2009); RBI.
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E Further Results Related to Exploration of Mecha-
nisms
Table 9: Tau vs Strikes and Lockouts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tau tau tau tau tau
strikes per capita -0.0584
(0.208)
mandays lost due to -0.00607
strikes per capita (0.0771)
lockouts per capita 0.0367
(0.0789)
mandays lost due to 0.0289
lockouts per capita (0.0750)
percent of factories 0.736⇤⇤
inspected (0.290)
log of net state -0.398 -0.387 -0.407 -0.407 0.547
domestic product pc (0.286) (0.258) (0.264) (0.261) (0.743)
Constant 4.085 3.946 4.132 4.138 -5.644
(2.729) (2.597) (2.630) (2.612) (7.681)
Observations 18 17 18 18 10
Note: This table tests for correlations between our estimated regulatory costs (tau) and other miscellaneous measures of
the labor environment. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the inverse
variance of tau and include only the 18 largest Indian States, as measured by NSDP. Sources: Indian Labour Year Book
(2005).
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-2 -1 0 1 2
Partial Residuals of Corruption Score
coef = .68529573, se = .13839014, t = 4.95
Note: This ﬁgure is the graphical analogue of column 3 in Table 4. It depicts the relationship between the components of tau
and the TI Corruption Score that are unexplained by the other covariates. Sources: Transparency International (2005);
Dougherty(2009); RBI.











































-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Partial Residuals of Transmission and Distribution Losses
coef = .57459008, se = .21044142, t = 2.73
Note: This ﬁgure is the graphical analogue of column 6 in Table 4. It depicts the relationship between the compo-
nents of tau and electricity transmission and distribution losses that are unexplained by the other covariates. Sources:
Dougherty(2009); RBI.
E.1 ⌧ and Corruption: State X Industry Analysis
In this portion of the Appendix, we explain our State X Industry analysis (described in
Section 6.1) in more detail. The purpose of this analysis is to partially address concerns
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that the state-level correlations between ⌧ and corruption lack exogenous variation and
may be biased if our measures of corruption are correlated with omitted variables that also
inﬂuence ⌧ . To do so, we take advantage of State X Industry level heterogeneity as an
additional source of variation. We use data from the World Bank’s 2005 Firm Analysis and
Competitiveness Survey of India (FACS) to create an industry level measure of the extent
to which regulations are problematic, which we term “regulatory intensity”. Speciﬁcally,
Indian ﬁrms in the 2005 FACS were asked whether “regulations speciﬁc to [their] industry”
were problematic for their “operation and growth”. Averaging the ﬁrm-level responses by
industry, we classify industries according to how likely businesses are to complain about
industry-speciﬁc regulations. If regulations are especially costly due to corruption in their
enforcement, then we would expect costs to be highest among those businesses in regulation-
heavy industries and in states with high corruption. That is, we would expect the interaction
between industry level “regulatory intensity” and state level corruption to be positive.
To test our hypothesis we generate our measures of ⌧ at the State X Industry level66
and regress those measures against interactions of state level corruption with industry level
regulatory intensity. The results, shown in Table 10 with and without interaction terms,
support our hypothesis. First, when excluding the interaction terms (columns 1 and 3), the
main eﬀects (state level corruption and industry level regulatory intensity) are signiﬁcantly
correlated with ⌧ in the expected directions. When interaction terms are included (columns
2 and 4), their coeﬃcients are also large and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the presence of
industry speciﬁc regulations is most costly when ﬁrms are located in a corrupt environment.
66Industries here are categorized according to their groupings in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys,
which distinguishes 23 distinct industry categories. Examples include “auto components”, “leather and
leather products”, and “food processing”. We only generated τ for state X industry cells with a suﬃcient
number of observations (in particular, for those with at least 40 observations in the size distribution), and
were thus left with only 190 observations out of a possible 414 (23*18).
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Table 10: Tau vs State Level Corruption Interacted with Industry Level “Regulatory Inten-
sity”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tau tau tau tau
log of net state -0.348⇤⇤⇤ -0.312⇤⇤⇤ -0.186⇤⇤⇤ -0.142⇤⇤⇤
domestic product pc (0.0298) (0.0311) (0.0288) (0.0298)
TI Corruption 0.0592⇤⇤⇤ 0.143⇤⇤⇤
Score (0.0140) (0.0291)
electricity TDLs 0.226⇤⇤⇤ 0.224⇤⇤⇤
(0.0215) (0.0206)
Regulatory 0.259⇤⇤⇤ 0.314⇤⇤⇤ 0.0937⇤⇤ 0.103⇤⇤⇤
Intensity (0.0288) (0.0328) (0.0284) (0.0274)
TI Corruption 0.160⇤⇤
Score X Regulatory Intensity (0.0492)
electricity TDLs 0.176⇤⇤⇤
X Regulatory Intensity (0.0435)
Constant -0.424⇤⇤⇤ -0.404⇤⇤⇤ -0.534⇤⇤⇤ -0.576⇤⇤⇤
(0.00849) (0.0103) (0.0121) (0.0156)
Observations 190 190 190 190
Note: This table reports the results of our estimated regulatory costs (tau) regressed against against state level corruption,
industry level regulatory intensity, and their interaction. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observa-
tions are now at the state X industry level but are still weighted by the inverse variance of tau and include only the 18
largest Indian States, as measured by NSDP. Sources: Transparency International (2005); RBI; World Bank Firm Analy-
sis and Competitiveness Survey of India (2005).
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